But can one reduce bodily awareness to body senses? The difficulty arises when one takes into account recent empirical evidence indicating that bodily awareness is infected by a plague of multisensory effects, regardless of any dichotomy between body senses and external senses. I will argue in this paper that the body senses fail to fully account for the content of bodily experiences, and that bodily awareness is constitutively multimodal-and in particular, that bodily awareness is constitutively visual. I will then deal with objections to this account that derive from the fact that those who lack sight have bodily experiences. I will finally argue that the multimodality of bodily experiences does not prevent privileged access to one's body.+ +
The puzzles of bodily experiences+
Let us start with considering the experience of one's arms being crossed. One can see them being crossed, but one can also feel them being crossed. What is the basis of such apparently simple experiences of the body from the inside? The physiological depending on their size and on the width of the shoulders.
One century after Sherrington (1906) introduced the notion of proprioception, neurophysiologists and psychologists no longer believe that the body senses can suffice to fully account for the spatiality of bodily experiences (e.g., Helms Tillery et al., 1991; van Beers et al., 1998) .
We found that subjects were unable to synthesize a reliable estimate of the locations of their hands in space using only kinaesthetic [proprioceptive] cues. (Helms Tillery et al., 1991, p. 771 )+ There is ... no afferent [somatosensory] signal, or combination of afferent signals, analogous to a global positioning system (GPS) signal. (Longo and Haggard, 2010, p. 658) In order to compensate for the insufficiencies of the body senses, bodily experiences need to be structured by a representation of the configuration and metrics of the body !"#$%&"'()*+()++ + 0+
segments. This hypothesis can be tracked back to Bonnier (1905) , who first introduced the notion of a body schema to refer to the spatial organization of bodily sensations. Head and Holmes (1911) also posited the existence of what they called a superficial schema, which is the model of the skin surface of the body used for localizing bodily sensations. More recently, Schwoebel and Coslett (2005) have postulated the existence of what they call a body structural description, which is impaired in patients suffering from autotopoagnosia: these patients are not able to correctly localize where they are touched, nor can they identify the various parts of their body. But it is O'Shaughnessy (1980, 1989, 1995) who best argues in favour of a dual specification of the spatial content of bodily experiences:+ At instant t1 one seems to be aware of a flexed arm because in general (and in fact over a period of decades) one takes oneself to be a being endowed with an arm which can adopt postures like stretched, flexed, etc.;
and because of the operation of postural sensations, etc., at t1. provided by body senses. Rather, it is also inherited from the long-term body image, which explains how the spatial content of all bodily experiences share the same ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + , +O'Shaughnessy distinguishes between three types of short-term body images: (), () and (). This distinction will play no role here and I shall leave it aside. + !"#$%&"'()*+()++ + 1+
anatomical shape of the body over an extended period.+ The long-term body image plays a structural role in spatially shaping short-term body images. In visual experiences, visual properties are ascribed to specific locations within the visual field.
In bodily experiences, bodily properties are ascribed to specific locations within the long-term body image. One can experience sensations in a phantom limb thanks to the long-term body image that still represents the amputated limb. Likewise, one can experience sensations at the tip of a tool, like Descartes' blind man with his cane, due to the fact that the long-term body image has incorporated the cane. O'Shaughnessy (1995) further argues that if the long-term body image misrepresented the body as being octopus shaped, then the spatial content of short-term body images, and henceforth of bodily experiences, would be within the reference frame of the octopus shape. In other words, one would feel one's tentacles crossed.
'Long-term body image', 'superficial schema', and 'body structural description', all refer to more or less the same notion, that is, the representation of the spatial configuration and the dimension of the body that is required to shape bodily experiences. Here, I adopt O'Shaughnessy's terminology, although I will argue against some of the claims that he makes about bodily experience. O'Shaughnessy argues for a dual specification of short-term body images, both in terms of body senses and in terms of a long-term body image. But is that all there is to bodily awareness? Can the long-term body image suffice to compensate for the insufficiencies of body senses?
And what is the origin of the long-term body image? The discovery of the Rubber
Hand Illusion, along with other recent empirical findings on multisensory interaction, may offer some replies to these questions. They raise fascinating new questions for bodily awareness about the consequences of seeing one's body. Here I shall argue that multisensory mechanisms can help solve the puzzles of bodily experiences. I shall Illusion, participants sit with one arm resting on a table, hidden behind a screen. They are asked to visually fixate on a rubber hand presented in front of them, and the experimenter simultaneously strokes with two paintbrushes both the participants' hand and the fake hand. The illusion occurs after a couple of minutes, but only if the two hands are in congruent position and synchronously stimulated (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005) . Most participants then report feeling as if they were touched on the rubber hand and as if the rubber hand were their hand. After the stroking, both the rubber hand and the
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++++ +
2 O n e c a n d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e i n t e r action among body senses (for instance, proprioception influences touch) and the interaction between external senses and body senses (for instance, vision influences proprioception). I will focus on this latter type of interaction. For sake of simplicity, I will use the notion of multimodality only to refer to the interaction between external senses and body senses.
biological hand are hidden from sight and subjects are asked to indicate on a ruler where they feel their hand to be. Results show that they mislocate their hand as being closer to the rubber hand than it is. Furthermore, when they see the rubber hand hit by a hammer, subjects react vividly, as if their own hand were hit (Ehrsson et al., 2007) .
The Rubber Hand Illusion illustrates how visual information about a rubber hand being stroked can alter tactile and proprioceptive signals, so that one feels touch on the rubber hand and feels one's hand as being closer to where the rubber hand is. The Parchment Skin Illusion, by contrast, highlights the role of auditory information for bodily experiences. In this illusion, the sounds produced by the participants' hands rubbing back and forth are recorded and played back to the participants through headphones. When the recorded sounds are distorted and the high frequencies accentuated, participants report feeling their skin dry, almost like parchment (Jousmaki and Hari, 1998) .+
The resolution of conflict between somatosensory information and visual/auditory information leads here to illusory experiences. But most of the time the presence of external information improves the reliability and accuracy of bodily experiences. For instance, viewing the body part that is touched (without viewing the object that is touching it) enhances tactile acuity so that one's judgements about tactile sensations are both faster (Tipper et al., 1998 ) and more accurate (Kennett et al., 2001) . The link between bodily experiences and visual/auditory information can sometimes be so tight that the mere presence of the latter can automatically induce the former. We are all familiar with the unpleasant bodily sensation triggered by the sound of fingernails scratching a chalkboard. It was also found that when participants saw the light from a laser pointer 'stroking' a rubber hand, more than half of them reported that they felt the touch of the laser on their skin (they said that it felt 'warm', for example), even
though their own hand was not stroked (Durgin et al., 2007) . Some individuals with what is known as mirror-touch synaesthesia even report experiencing tactile sensations on their own body when they see someone else being touched. For example, when they see another individual being touched on their right cheek, they report feeling touch on their own left or right cheek. Their reports were confirmed by activation in somatosensory areas in their brains (Blakemore et al., 2005 
multimodality of perceptual experience, to the exclusion of attentional and cognitive levels. This is not to say that attentional multimodality and cognitive multimodality are of no interest, but rather that they have no direct relevance for understanding the fundamental nature of bodily experiences.
Just to take an example of multisensory interaction with no bearing on the understanding of the nature of bodily experience, let us consider the neuropsychological syndrome of tactile extinction. After right-hemisphere lesion, some patients have no difficulty in processing an isolated tactile stimulus on the left side of their body. However, when they are simultaneously touched on the right hand, they are no longer aware of the touch on their left hand. Interestingly, the same is true when they merely see a visual stimulus near the right hand: the visual stimulus on the right side extinguishes the tactile stimulus on the left side so that they fail to detect the touch (Di Pellegrino et al., 1997) . A version of the same type of tactile extinction has been found in healthy participants. The presentation of a visual stimulus close to a body part dominated (or even extinguished) tactile sensations when participants had to respond as quickly as possible to both elements of the visuo-tactile target (Hartcher-O'Brien et al., 2008) . This indicates that vision and touch can be in competition for the same attentional resources. Visuo-tactile extinction illustrates how the mere presence of multisensory effects, no matter how pervasive they are, does not suffice to show that tactile experiences per se are multimodal. One has to show that those multisensory effects directly result from the nature of bodily experiences themselves (rather than from the nature of attention for instance). The defence of this thesis requires some discussion of the thorny issue of the boundary between a weak constitutive thesis and a merely causal thesis. One may
indeed challenge that there is a substantive difference between the two. Still I think that this distinction calls for a more thorough examination. How does a weak constitutive thesis differ from the claim that input in one modality has a causal impact on experiences in another modality? Arguably, there are specific situations in which it may be difficult to determine whether a relationship is weakly constitutive or merely causal.+ This is the case of flavour perception for instance. It is well known that gustatory experiences are strongly influenced by olfaction and that food tastes differently when we have a cold (Auvray and Spence, 2008) . But it is difficult to qualify exactly the relation between olfaction and flavour (Smith, 2007 , Macpherson, 2011 . On the one hand, one may hesitate before claiming that flavour consists in olfaction, for we retain some gustatory experiences even during the worst cold. On the other hand, we do not want to claim that olfaction is just one among many other factors that can influence flavour. Although it has been found that hearing the sound of the ocean makes oysters taste better (Blumenthal, 2008) , the contribution of audition to gustatory experience is hardly equivalent to the contribution of olfaction.
The relationship of olfaction to gustatory experience thus typically seems to be neither fully constitutive nor merely causal. I will now argue that the relationship of vision to bodily experience falls in the same grey zone.
At first sight, the fact that blind people have bodily experiences may be taken as evidence that vision (and multisensory binding) is not necessary for bodily awareness. This is true if one defines bodily awareness as the awareness as of having a body. But one may want to refine this definition. In particular, one may offer a teleological account of bodily experiences, according to which the etiology of bodily experience is partly determined by its function. Arguably, bodily experiences evolved to reliably track bodily states. Their function is to afford a veridical rendering of bodily Shaughnessy, 1980) . It is fulfilled if and only if bodily experiences are reliably correlated with bodily states that they are designed to indicate. The question has now become whether vision is necessary to the veridical rendering of bodily properties. And the answer is that it is indeed necessary. We have seen how body senses fail to fully account for bodily experience. Further information is needed to compensate for these flaws, and in particular visual information, which is characterized by its spatial richness and reliability. As claimed by Stein and Meredith (1993, p. 6) , "the sensory modalities have evolved to work in concert". The same can be said of vision and body senses. Their interaction improves the likelihood of detecting, localizing and identifying bodily events and properties. It is thus beneficial to combine different sources of information in order to achieve the best perceptual judgments. In other words, the more information the better.
This is not to say that any information that influences bodily experience plays the It has been selected by evolutionary pressure because it is required by the very nature of bodily experiences. Consequently, the contribution of vision to bodily experiences is not a mere causal accident. On my account, certain types of causal relations and dependencies can amount to constitutive relations when they have been selected to contribute to the fulfilment of a given function. I qualify these relations as weakly constitutive. In this sense, bodily awareness is constitutively visual. It is, however, were only a head (Gallagher and Cole, 1995) . His case vividly illustrates the difference between vision and body senses. As we shall see in the next sections, the loss of vision does not lead to such extinction of bodily awareness. None the less, we
shall also see that it does not go without major consequences. In particular, I will argue that bodily experiences would not have the same type of spatiality if one were born blind. It is also worth noting that vision can partially compensate for the loss of proprioception and touch in deafferentation. As soon as IW had learnt to rely exclusively on visual information, he became able to control his movements and he regained some awareness of his body (Cole, 1991 As hard as we might introspect, we cannot experience a raw bodily sensation devoid of any spatiality. Furthermore, the spatiality of bodily sensations is dual. In O'Shaughnessy's terms, we experience sensations "at-a-part-of-body-at-a-point-inbody-relative-space". For instance, when we feel touch on our hand, not only do we experience the pressure in a specific location within our long-term body image (e.g., our right hand), we also experience this part of our body in a specific location in the external world (e.g., on the right). As we have seen in section 1, somatosensory information does not suffice to fully account for the dual spatiality of bodily experiences. I shall now argue that vision plays an essential role in building up the long-term body image and in grounding short-term body images.
How are we aware that it is our arm that is moving to the right? And how are we aware of the size of our arm? I have argued that the information is supplied by the Shaughnessy (1995 Shaughnessy ( , 2000 defends the view that proprioception is fundamentally different from vision. If this is true, one may then wonder whether those differences could prevent multisensory integration. However, we know that the Rubber Hand Illusion could not exist if visuo-proprioceptive integration were impossible. Furthermore, there are differences not only between vision and proprioception, but also among all sensory modalities. Again, this does not prevent their integration. This only raises a complex computational problem, known as the 'recoding problem' in the multisensory literature (Pouget et al., 2001) . For further discussion of the recoding problem, see Vignemont (forthcoming). of your hand, you will pre-shape your hand to grasp an object as if your hand were bigger (Marino et al. 2010 ). But it is only when one considers how we are aware of the size of the various segments of our body that one realizes how essential is vision for the veridicality of the long-term body image. Arguably, the length of each segment of the body, and even more their width, cannot be entirely genetically determined. Furthermore, we have seen that the body senses do not directly carry information about body metrics. Only vision can directly and reliably (though not perfectly) process size information (Longo and Haggard, 2010) . Vision is thus needed in order to fill in the metric details of the long-term body image.
8 There are several recent findings that indicate that the long-term body image is altered by the Rubber Hand Illusion. For example, it was found that if the rubber hand that was stroked was bigger than the real hand, then participants judged their hand bigger (Pavani and Zampini, 2007) . Another recent illusion, the Supernumerary Limb Illusion, shows that when participants can see both their real hand and the rubber hand, they can feel sensations in the two hands (Guterstam et al., 2011) . Taken all together, these results argue in favour of a multimodal long-term body image in sighted people (e.g., Mancini et al., 2011) . Visual information about one's own (and possibly other people's) body parts shapes the long-term body image that spatially structures bodily experiences and bodily actions. Vision is as essential as body senses for a veridical rendering of body configuration and metrics. The various sources of information -innate, visual, somatosensory -are integrated together into a unified multimodal representation such that one cannot normally retrieve the original information derived from each source.
!"#$%&"'()*+()++ + -5+
Bodily experiences are thus spatially structured by a multimodal long-term body image. I will now argue that bodily experiences are also multimodal because of the role of vision in determining the content of short-term body images. When you feel your arm moving to the right, not only do you feel that it is your arm that is moving, but also that your arm is moving over to the right. Proprioception carries information about the posture and the location of body parts. Yet, as argued in section 1, it does not suffice for reliable correspondence between the location of the body in the external world and short-term body images.
Short-term body images thus require other sources of information, both to supplement for informational limits (such as information about the length of the segments connecting the joints and the width of each body part) and to improve their accuracy. Vision is then a good candidate to fulfil both functions because it provides highly accurate and rich spatial information. In general, vision offers more reliable information about spatial properties than touch and proprioception, and it often dominates over them when there is a conflict. 9 It is thus optimal to combine visual information with proprioceptive information in order to achieve the most accurate perceptual estimate of bodily location (van Beers et al., 1999) .++ This is well illustrated by prismatic adaptation (Welch and Warren, 1980) . When participants wear prismatic goggles that displace the visual field laterally by a fixed amount (typically, 10-16°), the visual system carries information about the location of their hand that is incongruent with somatosensory information. After a while, the visual deviation affects not only where the participants see and judge their hand to be, but also where they feel their hand to be. Two interesting facts are worth noting here.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 4 +However, in some perceptual contexts, proprioception is more accurate than vision. For instance, the weight of proprioceptive information can be larger than the weight of visual information when the hand is actively moving and for certain spatial directions (e.g., depth) (Van Beers et al., 2002) . Interestingly, they have no current visual experience of either hand when they are asked to make the report. Yet, their bodily experience is determined by the location of the rubber hand, which was only visually accessible. As argued earlier, the rubber hand is integrated into the long-term body image, which determines the spatial content of the short-term body image. The short-term body image then takes into account visual information about the location of the rubber hand. In other words, the experience of the participants' hand location is determined by the multimodal shortterm body image constructed during the illusion. This multimodal short-term body image persists beyond the lack of online visual input. Indeed, it has been found that even if participants move their hand after the stroking and then return to the same !"#$%&"'()*+()++ + --+ location, they still mislocalize their hand toward the rubber hand (Kammers et al., 2009) . Their bodily experience is determined by the multimodal short-term body image despite the proprioceptive update. + It has also been found that short-term body images can result from the integration of current proprioceptive information and visual prediction of hand location (Smeets et al., 2006) . In one study, participants were asked to move a cube between four positions with and without visual feedback from their hand movement. 
Blind bodily experiences
Let us return once again to the Rubber Hand Illusion, but with a different design that does not appeal to the vision of the rubber hand (Petkova et al., 2012) . were touching their own hand, some even claim that it was 'absurd'. When asked to point to their hand, they show no proprioceptive drift. 12 As the authors conclude:
"This finding suggests the existence of fundamental differences in central body representation between blind and sighted individuals." (Petkova et al., 2012, p. 8) . But what are those fundamental differences?
First, one can note that individuals who are congenitally blind or have become blind in childhood have a partially distorted long-term body image. The tactile and kinesthetic information that they receive about their body metrics and configuration cannot fully compensate for the lack of visual information. In particular, without visual input, the long-term body image misrepresents the size of the various segments of the body to a greater extent than with visual input. For instance, Helders (1986) reported that their torso appears to blind individuals long and very narrow with disproportionately big arms and hands. Kinsbourne and Lempert (1980) also showed that blind individuals have a less accurate representation of the size of their body parts
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++++ +
12 Blind subjects and sighted blindfolded subjects localized their hand equally well in a non-illusory set-up. The absence of proprioceptive drift in blind subjects thus could not be explained by better proprioceptive abilities.
compared to sighted individuals. This seems to result in some motor impairments (Levtzion-Korach et al., 2000) . 13 As Kinsbourne and Lempert (1980, p. 37) were less accurate than sighted subjects. This confirms that visual information, when available, increases spatial accuracy. By contrast, in the eyes-closed condition, blind subjects outperformed sighted subjects. 14 These interesting findings indicate that the difference between sighted and blind bodily experiences cannot be reduced to the mere presence versus absence of online visual input. Indeed, even with eyes closed, the performance of blind subjects differs from that of sighted subjects. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, we have seen that the processing of bodily information in those who can see is shaped by the almost constant involvement of visual information (based on online vision, visual memory, visual prediction), which provides highly accurate and rich spatial information. The side effect of this otherwise advantageous feature is that even in the absence of visual information, sighted ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 13 Unfortunately, the few studies on action control in congenitally blind people do not directly address the question of size misperception. There are delays in early motor developments in congenitally blind children (Sonksen et al., 1984; Adelson and Fraiberg, 1974; Jan et al., 1975; Levtzion-Korach et al., 2000) . However, there may be other factors influencing these impairments, which are not necessarily linked to the long-term body image.
,/ +Further studies found that tactile acuity was enhanced in both early and late blind participants in studies where participants had their eyes closed (e.g., Goldreich and Kanics, 2003; Alary et al., 2009; Yoshimura et al., 2010) .
individuals do not rely as much as they could on somatosensory information for shortterm body images. On the other hand, blind individuals compensate for the lack of vision by dedicating more resources to somatosensory processing, which can improve the accuracy of their short-term body images (Yoshimura et al., 2010; Goldreich and Kanics, 2003) . This is revealed by large-scale cortical reorganisation (for review, see Merabet and Pascual-Leone, 2010) . For instance, tactile practice involved by reading
Braille leads to an enlargement of the finger areas in the somatosensory cortex (Sterr et al., 2003) . Furthermore, neurons that would normally respond to visual stimulation can be recruited by body senses when visual input is entirely absent. Finally, somatosensory inputs to multisensory areas that are recruited for spatial perception and attention increase thanks to the lack of competing visual input.
We have thus good evidence that the sensory processing of bodily properties is distinct between blind and sighted individuals. However, the most convincing evidence that the resulting bodily experiences are of two distinct kinds involves nothing more than the following simple manipulation. Close your eyes and cross your hands over your body midline. If your left hand is briefly touched, and then your right hand, you take longer and are less accurate in judging which hand was touched first than if your hands are uncrossed (Yamamoto and Kitazawa, 2001) . 15 This effect has been observed both in sighted adults who have their eyes closed and in noncongenitally blind adults. But it is reduced when sighted adults cross their hands in a space that is not visually accessible like behind their back (Kobor et al., 2006) . And it is absent in sighted young children and in congenitally blind adults (Röder et al., 2004; Pagel et al., 2009 ).
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + ,0 +Participants gave a motor response to avoid any verbal bias.
The effect can be explained by the conflict between two spatial frames of bodily experiences: the frame of the body (left hand) and the frame of the external world (on the right).+ The location of the touch within the bodily frame is remapped into the external frame (e.g., the touch on your left hand is represented on the right when your binding. Each sensory modality is encoded in its own spatial frame (e.g., eye-centred vision, head-centred audition, skin-centred touch). In order for the information coming from different modalities to be integrated it must be translated into a common reference frame. This common frame can be amodal or the frame of one modality. But there can be translation only if one has been exposed to and learnt another language.
Likewise multisensory translation requires past experiences in another modality in order to learn its specific format or structure such as its spatial frame of reference.
Once the format is learnt, translation from one modality to another, including spatial remapping, is an automatic low-level perceptual process. Perceptual experiences in one modality during development can thus have long-term consequences on perceptual experiences in a different modality.
Here I argue that the common reference frame is primarily visual. The visual frame of reference is of special interest because the world with which one interacts is mainly given through vision. Location within a body-centred frame of reference used by touch is remapped into the eye-centred frame used by vision. 16 As a result of multisensory translation, one cannot separately experience the hand location within
16 Multisensory translation is a necessary step to multisensory binding when the format differs among the modalities. However, it can occur in the complete absence of current visual information, as illustrated by the results above. There is then no binding, merely spatial remapping into the visual reference frame.
the tactile body-centred reference frame and within the visual eye-centred reference frame. In other words, one cannot help but take into account the two frames, even when they come into conflict.
If the common frame is visually grounded, as I argue, then one expects the effect to be diminished or erased when the hands are crossed in a space that is not visually accessible and when one is blind. Both predictions have been empirically confirmed.
In particular, congenitally blind people and young children have no difficulty in judging where they were touched first when their hands are crossed: visuo-tactile translation does not occur. This reveals that in their case there is no conflict between the two spatial frames. This is not to say that congenitally blind individuals and young children have no external reference frame in general. It only shows that in their case tactile information is not automatically remapped into the frame in eye-centred coordinates because of the lack of visual experiences at crucial stages in development (Pagel et al., 2009) The role of vision in bodily experiences is not restricted to a couple of bodily illusions. Rather, bodily illusions reveal a fundamental fact about bodily awareness, namely, its multimodality. One may, however, wonder whether the Multimodality Thesis is compatible with another fundamental fact about bodily awareness, the fact that it holds a privileged relationship to one's own body. In particular, it is widely accepted that bodily experiences can ground judgements that are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person (Evans, 1982; Berm7dez, 1998; Brewer, 1995; Dokic, 2003; Longuenesse, 2012; Peacocke, 2012; Recanati, 2007; Vignemont, 2012) . Typically, it is said that when I feel my arms crossed, I can rationally doubt whether they are crossed or not, but I cannot rationally doubt that they are mine. The immunity to error of bodily judgements (hereafter bodily IEM) is classically explained by the special way of gaining knowledge about the body that is afforded by the body senses, which ensure, so to speak, that one's own body is the relevant body for the evaluation of the bodily property. One can thus dispense with self-identification of the type "the arms that I feel crossed are mine".+ Now what happens if bodily experiences are grounded not only in body senses, but also in vision? From some specific visuo-spatial perspectives, the only body one can see is one's own. For instance, the nose I see at the foreground when I close one eye can only be mine. As such, vision can guarantee bodily IEM and its involvement in bodily experiences can only reinforce their special link to the body. However, this type of case is more the exception than the rule (for further exceptions, see Vignemont, 2012) . Typically, the hands I see typing could be yours, and our hands can be easily confounded if we play a duet in piano, for example. Hence, most of the time I need to identify whose body I see and I can rationally doubt that the arms that Welch and Warren (1980) noted the challenge of accounting for the mechanisms that select the relevant signals to integrate (the parsing condition): multisensory binding depends on the cognitive assumption that the various signals carry information about the same object: + an intersensory conflict can be registered as such only if the two sensory modalities are providing information about a sensory situation that the observer has strong reasons to believe (not necessarily consciously) signifies a single (unitary) distal object or event. This has been termed the "unity assumption" (e.g., Welch & Warren, 1980) . (Welch, 1999, p. 373 Visual dissimilarities, including difference in hand shape, skin complexion and ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + ,2 +However, some experimental results seem to indicate that what one believes about the typical colour of objects affects how one experiences the colour of objects (for instance, Delk and Fillenbaum, 1965) . Based on this type of result, one may argue in favour of a kind of cognitive penetration of perceptual processes (see Macpherson, 2012) . If so, perceptual multimodality may be compatible with the cognitive unity assumption.+ !"#$%&"'()*+()++ + ..+ handedness (left rubber hand and right biological hand) can reduce the illusion to some extent, but it does not prevent it (Hans et al., 2008; Longo et al., 2009; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2009) . Interestingly, in a variant of the RHI set-up that uses a virtual whole body rather than a rubber hand, participants experience a full-body illusion for a virtual avatar of a different gender (Slater et al., 2010) . All that is required to elicit the illusion is that: (i) the seen object looks like a hand, preferably of the same laterality, (ii) the rubber and the real hands are spatially congruent, and (iii) the stroking is synchronous. Based on these results, it seems unlikely that the participants must feel that their hand is F, see that the rubber hand is F, erroneously judge that their rubber hand is their own hand, and integrate what they feel with what they see. It may rather be the reverse. Participants do not judge that their hand is visually similar to the rubber hand and then experience the illusion; rather, they experience the illusion and only then do they feel as if the rubber hand were their hand (if they do not experience the illusion, like after asynchronous stroking, then they do not feel their hand to be similar to the rubber hand) (Longo et al., 2009) . On this view, the selfattribution of the rubber hand is not a prerequisite of visuo-somatosensory binding; it is a consequence of it. + There needs to be selection and a registration at some level that the signals are about one's body, but it does not necessarily need to be at the cognitive level (Vignemont, forthcoming). In the same way that there is a perceptual mechanism that selects the relevant elements (e.g., shape and color) to bind together in unimodal experience (see Treisman, 1999 for example), there may be a perceptual mechanism that selects the relevant information to bind together in multimodal experiences, potentially partially constrained by the long-term body image (e.g., what is seen must look like a body part for the visual information to be selected, cf. Tsakiris, 2010). It !"#$%&"'()*+()++ + ./+ may be based on the number of perceptual features that are congruent relative to the weighting assigned to these features (e.g., spatial location is more important and so has a higher weight than visual appearance) (Ernst, 2006) . One can then dispense with self-identification. Hence, visuo-somatosensory binding, as found for instance in the Rubber Hand Illusion and prisms adaptation, does not necessarily threaten the special relationship to one's own body that characterizes bodily experiences. 
